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THE SFR YUGOSLAVIA DURING THE COLD WAR AND CURRENT SERBIAN FOREIGN POLICY*

Abstract: This paper will discuss the policy of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the Cold War period, and some of its repercussion for the current Serbian foreign policy. The SFR Yugoslavia, though a communist country, did not belong to the Eastern bloc (WTO). Due to its political orientation and geographical role it did not belong to the Western bloc (NATO) either. Therefore, Yugoslavia, with its president Josip Broz Tito, used this to its advantage to play an intermediary position and to cooperate with the both sides at different times. At the same time, Yugoslavia developed and implemented a non-aligned attitude towards international affairs with India, Egypt and Burma. Thus, the SFR Yugoslavia was one of the founding countries of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). As a result, Yugoslavia was, at the beginning, the only European country in the Movement and was the host country of the first Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries in 1961. In this respect, Yugoslavia propagated itself as a bridge between the Eastern and the Western bloc. The analysis of historical data will show that this non-aligned position was a consequence of Yugoslav balancing between the "two poles" and finding the best option for the country. Currently, the main goal of the Republic of Serbia's (RS) foreign policy is to enter the European Union. At the same time, Serbian politicians are simultaneously trying to influence the NAM in order to accomplish support against Kosovo independence. In other words, since the only European country in the NAM is currently Belarus, Serbian politicians exploit Serbia's European position and its Yugoslavian legacy. I will explore SFRY: NAM :: RS:NAM relationships in order to examine current Serbian foreign politics. Hence, this paper makes parallel between the non-aligned position of the SFRY as "a strategy of survival" during the Cold War and current foreign policies of the Republic of Serbia and its strategies for achieving the following goals: entering the European Union and gaining support against Kosovo's independence.

Key words: Non-Aligned Movement, SFR Yugoslavia, strategy of survival, Republic of Serbia, foreign policy, EU

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I Introduction

One of the effects of the Cold War is the occurrence of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The Non-Aligned Movement is created in the second half of the 20th century amongst countries against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). More precisely, it represents a doctrine among the countries opposed to both, the West and to the Soviet politics. While most of the countries in the NAM were (and remain) from Asia, South America and Africa, one of the most significant countries in the Movement and one of the founder countries was from the European continent – the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). This paper will discuss the international politics of the SFR Yugoslavia during the Cold War period and some of its repercussion on current Serbian foreign policy. In particular, this paper juxtaposes official foreign affairs of the former SFR Yugoslavia and one of its countries' descendants, the Republic of Serbia (RS) with an aim to give an overview of similar rhetoric and strategies used by both. In other words, the article makes a parallel between the non-aligned position of the SFRY's "strategy of survival" during the Cold War (Bogetić 2000) and current Serbian foreign politics' strategies for achieving its goals: the entrance to the European Union (EU) and obtaining the support against the Kosovo independence. This research draws on a wide range of sources from history (Petranović 1988; Bogetić 1990, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2004 and 2006; Vestad 2008; Јовановић 2006), sociology (Connerton 1989; Kuljić 1997 and 1998; McCrone 1998; Lazić 2003) and anthropology (Prošić-Dvornić 1995, 1988 and 2000; Živković 2001; Jansen 2005; Bakić-Hayden 2006; Naumović 2008 and 2009) and international relations (Kardelj 1977; Stojković 1979; Tito 1981; Damian-Lakićević 2000). Furthermore, contemporary Serbian foreign policy will be explored through recent Serbian daily newspapers (*Политика*, *Вечерње новости*, *Blic*) and Internet articles (mostly from the websites <http://www.b92.net/info/> and <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world/europe/>) conclusive with the data available on 30th July 2010. By examining the association between the SFRY and the RS, this research endeavours to describe and explain their relationship. By focusing on existing situations in Serbia, the aim of this paper is to extend the general understanding about the Republic of Serbia's politics and the rhetorical pattern utilised in international relations. In this respect, the next sections will question and explore if Serbia's foreign policy is not "just a little bits of history repeating".²

² Throughout the paper I use the lyrics of the popular song "History Repeating" by Alex Gifford.

II Historical background

a) SFRY-FRY-RS

The Republic of Serbia was part of the communist Yugoslavia (or the "Second Yugoslavia")³, which existed, with different names, from 1945 till 1991. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) united six states: Serbia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina with the idea of "brotherhood and unity" of all federations⁴ and was governed by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and its president Josip Broz Tito. According to the Serbian sociologist Kuljić, Tito's charisma was one of the most important elements for the long-term integration of Yugoslavia (Kuljić 1997, 67). He became the first honourable member of the Serbian Academy of Science in 1948, and the country's lifelong president in 1974 (Petranović 1988, 157; 413). Moreover, Tito was called "the ethnically undifferentiated inheritor of the South Slav heroic tradition", while the ideas of 'worker self-management' and 'brotherhood and unity' were accepted as Titoist creations (Simić 2000, 114).

Two Serbian autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, were granted the highest level of autonomy with the entry of the Constitution in 1974. As Naumović (2009, 61) asserts, this act aimed to prevent possible Serbian domination. However, Naumović explains that the autonomy of Kosovo transformed Kosovo Serbs into a minority group in their own republic. Consequently, pressures from an Albanian majority resulted in continuous Serbian migration (Naumović 2009, 61-62). Yet, the real crisis in Yugoslavia occurred in the 1980s. First with Tito's death in 1980, followed by the Albanian students' revolts in 1981 and Milošević's gain of control in the Serbian League of Communist in 1987 (Naumović 2008; Luci and Marković 2008, 284). These events, including inflation, foreign debt, unemployment, and the consequences of ineffective and unequal self-management (Jansen 2005, 16) "prepared the stage for the break-up of Yugoslavia" (Naumović 2008, 220; 240). This "*phase of aggravating economic and political crisis*" culminated with the secession of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia (Naumović 2008, 240). In 1992, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) which consisted of Serbia and Montenegro was established. In 2003, the FRY was transformed into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. This state was

³ The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes existed from 1918 till 1941. While the state changed its name to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929, it is generally known as the First Yugoslavia.

⁴ Brotherhood and unity concept assumed "harmonious coexistence of linked but different groups of people" and their rights to preserve their national identities and self-determination right (Prošić-Dvornić 2000, 318).

short-lived as Montenegro declared independence in 2006. As for Kosovo, it became a UN protectorate after NATO bombardment of the FRY in 1999.⁵ Finally, in 2008, the Albanian majority in the Kosovo region declared its independence. Officially, the Serbian government still considers Kosovo to be a part of Serbian territory and the independence of Kosovo is not acknowledged as legally valid.⁶ As Naumović notes, Kosovo, once a center of medieval Serbian state, culture and Orthodox Christian religion, still represents for Serbs "the cradle of national tradition" and "holly land" of their religion and culture, history and national identity (Naumović 2009, 62). In order to obtain votes from the UN countries against Kosovo independence, Serbian official foreign policy exploits its SFRY heritage, and more precisely, the Yugoslav role in the Non-Aligned Movement.

b) NAM and the Yugoslavian principles of the non-alignment

The Non-Aligned Movement was established during the Cold War as an organisation of international countries who did not belong to NATO and were opposed to participate in the WTO in the 1950s. Before the formal establishing of the Movement, the non-aligned doctrines were formulated by the Indian Congress in 1920 (Bogetić 2001, 66). In 1954, India and China formulated five principles of peaceful coexistence (Panchsheel): mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the countries, non-violence and non-aggression, non-interference, equality and co-existence (Petranović 1988, 22; 361). Consequently, the real forerunner of the NAM represented the Asian-African meeting, held in 1955 in Bandung. At the Bandung Conference colonialism was attacked and the country participants agreed on improving world peace and

⁵ By criticising Milošević's totalitarian and nationalist politics Prošić-Dvornić (1998) predicts the future of Kosovo: "Negative historic memories are built on the fact that during World War II hundreds of thousands of Serbs were expelled from the region by the Albanian collaborators of the Axis. In the aftermath the Serbs were forbidden to return to their land, and the province was clandestinely repopulated by large numbers of illegal immigrants from Albania. This, in addition to an extremely high birth rate among ethnic Albanians in Serbia, accounts for a large Albanian population increase over a relatively short span of time. All this has reversed the percentages of groups that make up ethnic structure of the province. Nevertheless, if Kosovo ceases to be a part of Serbia, it will not happen because there are 97 % Albanians living there. It will happen because of the catastrophic political strategy of the anachronic leader who wanted too much in very many wrong ways, and who had denied everyone else the rights he demanded for himself" (Prošić-Dvornić 1998, 91).

⁶ According to the BBC and their data from 23rd July 2010, 69 out of 192 United Nations members recognised Kosovo as an independent country. In the EU, 22 countries accepted the independence of Kosovo while Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Cyprus do not recognise it (Blic 2010b).

cooperation⁷ (Vestad 2008, 134; 139; Petranović 1988, 371). The NAM was founded in Belgrade in 1961 during the first Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State or Government (Vestad 2008, 144), "at which 25 countries were represented... largely through the initiative of Yugoslavian President Tito".⁸ The Movement was based on the principles of self-determination of countries, their mutual economic help, and neutral attitude in world politics, with an objective to establish and improve world peace and stability (Vestad 2008, 144). According to the NAM's website, Tito's major concern was to prevent the war between the Soviet Union and the USA.⁹ Furthermore, the Movement had accepted the Charter of the United Nations, pleaded for guarantees of sovereignty and national integrity of the countries, and held campaigns against colonialism and racism in order to disable world conflicts (Petranović 1988, 22). Thus, the most important doctrines of the NAM were positive neutrality, active and peaceful coexistence, as well as abstention from intervention and non-interference in internal politics of other countries. Concerning the Yugoslav position, Tito emphasised "the importance of developing peaceful economic, political and cultural development and democratic international relationships" (Petranović 1988, 361). According to Stojković (1979), one of the key thinkers in the non-aligned era of the SFRY, the goals of the non-alignment were: the strengthening of national independency; preserving world peace; socio-economic development through the transformation and democratisation of international political and economic relationships and the development of the principles of the coexistence. Petković, also one of the important theoreticians of the non-alignment in the SFRY, defined non-alignment as a politics for peace, and independence, which were against imperialism and in accordance with the goals of the UN (Petković 1974, 27).

Till now, there were 15 Non-Aligned Movement Summits of the Countries of the Non-Aligned Movement. The first (1961) and the ninth Summit were held in Belgrade (1989). During the tenth Summit in Jakarta in 1992, the FRY's role was suspended (Мишић 2009, 05)¹⁰ due to the UN Security Council's initiative and some Muslim countries of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Милинковић 1996, 279). Damian-Lakičević, from the Institute of

⁷ The countries signed a 10-point Bandung "Declaration on promotion of world peace and cooperation" - the respect of human rights and the principles of the UN Charter, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the rights of the nations to defend themselves, abstention from intervention or interference and aggression etc. (Vestad 2008; for detailed list of the principles see http://pd.cpim.org/2005/0605/06052005_bandung%20conf.htm).

⁸ <http://www.nam.gov.za/background/history.htm>

⁹ <http://www.nam.gov.za/background/history.htm>

¹⁰ <http://www.pcnen.com/Arhiva/2001/15-11-200.htm>

International Politics and Economy in Belgrade, explains that the legitimacy of Yugoslavia's role in the NAM was called into question during the Jakarta conference, since Yugoslavia was convicted for aggression, army conflicts, and war crimes on civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Damian-Lakićević 2000, 41). In New York 2001, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting now only of Serbia and Montenegro), accordingly had a status of a country-observer. At the last two conferences, held in Havana 2006 and in Sharm El Sheikh 2009, the Republic of Serbia, one of two successors of the FRY, had a status of a country-observer.¹¹ Today the NAM has 118 full membership countries and 22 countries with an observer status amongst which are Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro in addition to Serbia (Мишић 2008; 2009).

III Possible reasons for the Yugoslavian non-aligned orientation

After the end of WWII, Yugoslavia was economically poor. Industries were underdeveloped, factories were disabled, and agriculture was simple (Petranović 1988, 79-83). Furthermore, as Petranović (1988, 226; 245; 256) asserts, Yugoslavia was abandoned by the Soviet Union in 1948, while occasional improvements as well as worsening of their relationship marked the 1950s and the 1960s. In 1948, Yugoslavia's orientation towards the USSR was interrupted due to Stalin's accusations of Yugoslavia conducting anti-Soviet politics. According to some historians, Stalin's actions were provoked by the independence of the Yugoslav revolution in the Second World War, the expansion of Tito's reputation, internal development of an autonomous Yugoslavia (Petranović 1988, 259), and the Yugoslavs' overestimation of their own achievements in socialism (Cvetković 2005, 121). Paradoxically, Petranović (1988, 162-163) points out that Yugoslavia did not deepen relations with Western countries due to its communistic orientation, its loyalty to the Soviets and because of the incidents with the United States.¹² According to Lazić, "keeping the distance" from the Soviet Union in the 1950s and economic stability were only possible with the support from the West (Lazić 2003: 203). Thus, as Petranović claims, Yugoslavia did not cast out the possibility to ask the USA and the other capitalistic states for help (Petranović 1988: 92; cf. Lazić 2003: 203). Besides, after the conflict with Stalin and the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia did not have any other option but to ask for help from the West. Since Western rejection of Tito would automatically help Stalin, subsequently, one of the alternatives for the West was to support Yugoslavia as a way of

¹¹http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=09&dd=05&nav_category=206

¹² One of the major incidents is the crisis with the Alleys over the division of the free territory of Trieste between Yugoslavia and Italy (Petranović 1988, 199; 163).

weakening the communist bloc and undermining the influence of the Soviets (Petranović 1988, 247; 257-258; Bogetić 2005, 43). Following the normalisation of Soviet relations after Stalin's death in 1953, Yugoslavia continued to improve its diplomatic relationships with the West and with Asian, African and Latin-American countries (Petranović 1988, 557). The second Soviet-Yugoslav conflict occurred between 1958 and 1962. The Soviets still considered Tito as excessively autonomous in his political decisions and that Yugoslav foreign affairs undermined the unity of the communistic bloc (Bogetić 2004, 126-128). At the same time, relationships with the West were worsening as a result of Yugoslav acceptance of the German Democratic Republic in 1958, refusal of American military help and negative Yugoslav attitudes toward colonialism in Asia and Africa (Bogetić 2004, 123-124).

As noted above, Yugoslavia's confrontation with the East and the West during the 1950s meant it had to find a strategy to function within the blocs and cooperate with both. Lazić (2003: 204), for instance, explains that the Yugoslavia's non-alignment "was supposed to mean 'neither the East nor the West' but in reality it was a compound: both the East and the West". Developing doctrines of the peaceful coexistence, later on supported by the NAM, was a consequence of the conflicts between Yugoslavia and its communistic brothers and capitalistic enemies. Yugoslavia was not developed enough to be a leading country of the West (and not geographically in the West, except from the perspective of the Indian subcontinent. The country was not strong enough to impose itself as a leading socialist country. Thus, the NAM allowed overcoming all economical, political, social and cultural discrepancies and contradictions of Yugoslav society who provoked its crisis. Namely, Yugoslavia established its new foreign policy between 1954 and 1955, which included equidistance towards both blocs as a compromised solution (Bogetić 2000, 177). In this respect, the Non-Aligned Movement made possible the overcoming of Yugoslavia's international isolation (see Stojković 1979, 54). It was a method of preserving the country's independence in the world blocs' hegemony (Rajak 2005, 90). As Tito claimed (1981, 116-117), non-aligned countries had to be "the conscience of mankind" and have the strength to "actively contribute to their better future". Furthermore, non-aligned policy enabled the Yugoslav state to be independent in its internal social development, socialist ideas and self-government policies (Bogetić 1990, 33-38).

IV The East and the West

There are many theories about Orientalism, Balkanism and "variations on the Balkan theme" in the Balkan region (see Bakić-Hayden 2006; Todorova 2006). They all emphasise that historically, politically and culturally the

Balkans always represented the East (more precisely – "the Other"). These theories diverge among each others regarding the issue is the Balkans, as "the East", the sort of the Balkan variation of Orientalism, Ottoman, Byzantine or some other cultural and historical heritage (Rot 2000, 189-213; Bakić-Hayden 2006; Todorova 2006). However, all of them agree upon the matter that the East is associated negatively with the Balkans. On the other hand, Slavic peoples themselves, since the mid 19th century and the time of constitution of nation-states, believed to have a mission to "regenerate the 'Rotten West' and old 'gothic-German' Europe" (Скерлић 1966, 165). Later, some of the Slavic states started to identify themselves with the West (the Czech and the Slovak Republics) while the former Soviet Union sided with the East (Živković 2001, 2). Within this "symbolic geography" the Balkan states were "sometimes included in Central Europe, sometimes divided between Central Europe and Eastern Europe along the dividing line of Catholicism and Orthodoxy" and sometimes associated to Eastern Europe (Živković 2001, 2). In addition to this, the authors (Лутхар and Петровић 2005, 186; Todorova 2006, 69) acknowledge that for several centuries, the Balkans functioned as a metaphoric "bridge between civilisations", an inter-space between Europe and the Orient, which is, at the same time, part of both. Similarly, Bakić-Hayden asserts that while the Balkans functioned as the "European Other", during the Cold War, the East — classified as totalitarian and communist, was further distanced and separated from the West, which was seen as democratic and capitalistic (Bakić-Hayden 2006: 35). A clear example of this type of politics is the Yugoslavia's case during the second half of the 20th century,¹³ when it was between the NATO and the WTO. Within this framework, Yugoslavia used its position at the "intersection of roads", "coquetting" with both sides. For instance, Kardelj (1977: 119) writes about Yugoslavia as a European, socialist and non-aligned country, "which has an interest in the political opening of Europe, West and East, especially towards the non-aligned countries". As Živković (2001, 3) points out, Tito's Yugoslavia managed to escape from Western and Eastern political divisions thanks to its non-aligned strategy.¹⁴ In other words, Yugoslavia exploited its newly established position "between the East and the West" by using old stereotypes about the Balkans as a space which did not belong to any of the ideological matrices. Tito,

¹³ Looking historically, Bakić-Hayden (2006, 36) states that former Yugoslavia was a meeting point of different empires (Eastern and Western Roman, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian), Cyrillic and Latin letters, as well as (mostly) Roman-Catholic, Orthodox Christian and Muslim religions.

¹⁴ Though the East and the West are concepts (Bakić-Hayden 2006, 53-54), during the Cold War, Western Europe was a synonym for Europe, while the USSR and the Eastern bloc was seen as the East (Радовић 2007, 51).

himself, emphasising the importance of this position, claimed that Yugoslavia had to remain strong, firm and united between the Eastern and Western winds (Tito 1981, 166). Lazić (2003, 203) explains this important motif: "We are different from both the East and the West" became a kind of an identification sign of the country, and self-understanding of people in Yugoslavia, and perhaps in the first place in Serbia.

Furthermore, Lazić (2003, 204) reminds that between the 1950s and the 1990s Yugoslav society was split between the East and the West in the ideological, cultural, political and economic sphere (with its centrally planned economy and "self-management" policy). Thus, the same author explains that Yugoslavia's superiority over the West was based on the notion of an "historically more perfect" type of society", the socialist one (Lazić 2003, 205). It is believed that it was superior over the East because of its improved living standards, openness and modern culture (Lazić 2003, 205).

This position of "benign parasitising" on Eastern and Western ideologies provided greater freedom for Yugoslavs in their everyday life, increasing of consumer culture and the possibilities to travel easily across the boundaries (Bracewell 2006, 249). However, political and the economic crisis from the late 1980s and the break-down of communism, caused economic and political instability of Yugoslavia (Živković 2001, 4; Bracewell 2006, 264-265). Similarly, Galtung (1994) underlines that with the end of Cold War, the SFR Yugoslavia remained between the NATO and the WTO, which was falling apart. With regards to the issue of changes conditions after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Prošić-Dvornić (1995, 293) explains that all socialist countries had problems adapting to new conditions, due to several factors: the remaining socialist legacy, the absence of quality infrastructure network for the fulfilment of the reforms, and the lack of expected help from the West. In these countries, the crashes of the planed agricultural system lead to the collapse of production, unemployment, and abolition of subventions which further influenced on education, health system, science and culture (Prošić-Dvornić 1995, 294). More important, in that time Yugoslavia "was deprived of generous foreign financial aid" and had to settle its debts (Prošić-Dvornić 2000, 320). As for Serbia, all political and economic changes had to transform the society "according to the market and democratic model . . . [and to orient itself] towards the European West. Within this framework the public sphere soon reached a-tacit!-consensus that Serbia is an 'European country', which meant that the firm European orientation of the nation must be built in the historical, economic, political and, certainly, in the cultural sphere" (Lazić 2003, 195)

Even though in 2000, when the "nationalist authoritarianism" regime of Slobodan Milošević (Gordy 1999, 8) was dismantled, and a democratic party was elected, the economic, political and institutional obstacles of the

country's integration into Europe were still great (Lazić 2003, 207). In this slow process of democratic changes and capitalist transformation of Serbia, the victims were "manual workers, the unemployed, pensioners, peasants, the poor" (Lazić 2003, 207). Therefore the division "between the West and the East... emerged inside Serbia" (Lazić 2003, 207). Ultimately, the bipolarities of the East/West divisions remained.

V Dangerous liaisons or Non-Alignment "in Serbian manner"

According to Jovanović (2006: 91), the easiest way for overcoming crisis is overtaking solutions and social patterns from the 'past', "in order to form, or impose a different basis of current group self identification of the people and the society". Similarly, Connerton in his seminal work *How Societies Remember* stresses that our experience of the present depends on our knowledge of the past. That experience is different "in accordance with the different pasts to which we are able to connect that present" (Connerton 1989: 2). Therefore, the past can be used as a tool for influencing the way how present should be conceptualised in one society. In a similar manner, McCrone warns that "the 'past' is a powerful source of legitimacy for those who would change the present for a new future" (1998: 52). Hence, this author explains that national narratives about 'history' can be "charged" with "the past-present-future connections" in certain political and cultural circumstances (McCrone 1998: 62). In this regard, using examples from the media, this paper further analyses how the Yugoslav non-aligned rhetoric is exploited at the Serbian foreign policy stage. Considering that it is still a process in progress, the results are just general guidelines.

a. "The newspapers shout a new style is growing. But it don't know if it's coming or going"

The idea of a relationship between Serbia and Yugoslavia's non-aligned orientation is important as Geertz describes. "People use experience-near concepts spontaneously and un-self-consciously" not realising that they are concepts (Geertz 1983, 58). According to Spasić (2003, 110), manipulating with the idea of continuity between former SFR Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia (and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) was an important element in creating political, symbolical and cognitive confusion during the Milošević's regime. However, as it will be illustrated, a democratic regime uses a similar language of balancing between the poles: to enter the EU and to cooperate with the NAM in order to make possible political and economic contacts, as well as to influence their political decisions towards Kosovo's dissolution. In this section, examples from a wider Serbian political scene will be discussed.

Ž. Jovanović, a Serbian politician and diplomat, who supports the preservation of Kosmet within Serbian borders for Serbian integrity and sovereignty, thinks that the State should ask for help from Russia and South American, African and Asian countries and others major states in the UN (Mrdić 2008, 18). The same politician thinks that Serbia, as one of the founders of the NAM, should request a renewed membership in the NAM and that Serbian foreign policy should be "active neutrality". Mr. Jovanović assumes that Serbia's place in the NAM would help ensure a majority support for Serbian initiatives in the UN (Mrdić 2008, 18-19). Furthermore he argues for the "economic, technical, and military-technical collaboration . . . cooperation in the area of construction, energetic, and even in the domain of finances" with the NAM countries (Mrdić 2008, 18-19). Analogous to this, J. Ilić, a retired diplomat, member of the Forum for the International Relationships and former Minister Consultant in India, finds that the NAM can strengthen Serbian position in relation to the EU (Мишић 2009, 05). On the other hand, R. Jović, a retired diplomat and a former ambassador in Harare, opposes cooperation with non-aligned countries as it can harm Serbian intents to enter the EU (Мишић 2009, 05). At the same time, Mišić writes, that Mr. Jović thinks that Serbia should strategically export its products in non-aligned countries.

b. "Just little bits of history repeating"

This section focuses more in-depth on "dangerous liaisons", expressed as a foreign affair strategy from the Republic of Serbia. In the official political scene, there exists the idea that Serbia should reactivate its position in the NAM. This idea has been supported since 2001. Then, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia gained status of an observer country in New York. For this occasion, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Svilanović, declared that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a supporter of activities of the NAM, as one of the five successors of the SFRY.¹⁵ This re-established continuity with the SFRY and the legitimate right in the NAM was highlighted by current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jeremić, at the fifteenth Ministerial Conference held in Tehran 2008. Consequently, the minister invited NAM members to support Serbian legitimate role in the NAM and the illegitimate self-proclamation of Kosovo.¹⁶ "Serbia is not just an observer in the Non-Aligned Movement, but the successor of co-founder of

¹⁵ http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Srpski/spopol/Ministar/Govori/141101_s.html

¹⁶ <http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?pf=1&id=91668&url=%2Fvesti%2Fvest.php%3Fpf%3D1%26id%3D91668>; see <http://www.kim.gov.yu/cms/item/news/sr.html?view=story&id=4160§ionId=1>

SFR Yugoslavia...

the Movement — the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, whose president Josip Broz Tito was the first General Secretary of the Movement".¹⁷ This is contradictory to the fact that Serbia was not Yugoslavia and the official international strategy of Serbia was not to enter the NAM but to become part of the EU (Blic 2009; Kazimir Čurguz 2005; Blic 2010a). At the same time, it was to maintain good relationships with Russia.¹⁸ Minister Jeremić not only stressed the importance of the NAM but also indicated its continuity with the SFRY. As Gligorov (2008) points out, "Serbia is not the member of the Non-Aligned Movement and therefore could not have a significant role in that Movement ... And Josip Broz Tito was not the president of Serbia". Recent activities of Minister Jeremić show that he went to official meetings in non-aligned countries trying to take advantage of these visits to lobby support against Kosovo's independence (see Blic 2009b and Blic 2009g). While these politics do not automatically exclude ties with the NAM, it was very unusual, unless it was understood as Serbia overtaking the intermediary role "between the East and the West". In 2009, the idea of having an anniversary conference in Belgrade in 2011 was current since the first conference was held in Belgrade in 1961. Regarding this, Mr. Jeremić suggested the following at the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana 2009. "The Movement [should] come back home after five decades" in order to celebrate the anniversary of its establishment in Belgrade. Even though Serbia wants to enter the EU, it accepted the values of non-aligned countries.¹⁹ Minister, furthermore, declared that, in practice, this would mean to bring back "ideals and values" of the Movement to "the heart of Europe".²⁰ In relation to this, Mr. Jeremić again, stated that "Serbia was the largest successor of... the SFRY whose president Josip Broz Tito... significantly contributed to the development of a fairer world and helped Yugoslavia and the rest of the Non-Aligned Movement to gain international respect".²¹ Thus, almost in neo-colonial style, minister Jeremić, believes that one of the Serbia's foreign policy priorities should be "to restore the capital from the time of the SFRY with an aim to return Serbia to the same geographical locations where it was before" (Мишић 2009, 05).

¹⁷<http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/vest.php?pf=1&id=91668&url=%2Fvesti%2Fvest.php%3Fpf%3D1%26id%3D91668>

¹⁸http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2009&mm=04&dd=28&nav_category=11&nav_id=357742; http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2009&mm=05&dd=26&nav_category=11&nav_id=362561.

¹⁹ http://www.rtv.rs/sr/vesti/politika/politika/2009_04_30/vest_128346.jsp

²⁰ http://www.rtv.rs/sr/vesti/politika/politika/2009_04_30/vest_128346.jsp

²¹ http://www.rtv.rs/sr/vesti/politika/politika/2009_04_30/vest_128346.jsp

Similarly, like the minister Jeremić, the president of the Republic of Serbia, Boris Tadić, pleaded for the establishment of closer contacts with the non-aligned countries and developing cooperation with them. In other words, Mr. Tadić's politics was to familiarise them with Kosovo's situation and to lobby for- the once actively non-aligned within Yugoslavia- Serbia. From the Serbian perspective this is important in practice since non-aligned countries can represent important votes against the Kosovo separation in the UN. In April and July 2009, at the fifteenth Conference held in Sharm El Sheikh, Mr. Tadić, like Mr. Jeremić, suggested that Serbia should be the host of the jubilee Conference of the Non-Aligned countries in 2011 (Политика 2009а, 06).

However, as Mišić points out, these ideas raise dilemma: would this act jeopardize Serbian candidature for the EU membership (Мишић 2009, 05)? It can be noted that Mr. Tadić's rhetoric in international relations were more and more inclined to Tito's rhetoric and Yugoslavia's goal of having peaceful world politics. Mr. Tadić said in May 2009, at the Military Academy near the town of Čuprija, "that Serbia's policies are peaceful and that Serbia is one of the inevitable actors in the stability of South-East Europe".²² Furthermore, analogous to Yugoslavia's global and universal mission in world politics,²³ similar but more modest pretensions Mr. Tadić expressed at this event. "Serbia, with peaceful politics, contributes to resolving conflicts not just in the region, but elsewhere in the world where conflicts exist".²⁴ Consequently, Mr. Tadić and Mr. Jeremić had bilateral meetings in Sharm El Sheikh with the non-aligned countries representatives (Вечерње новости 2009b, 13; Политика 2009g, 02). The main topics of their meetings were issues on Kosovo and Metohija and Belgrade's official candidature for the next conference host city (Политика 2009g, 02; Вечерње новости 2009d, 12). In a struggle for the preserving the country's sovereignty, Mr. Tadić stated at this NAM Conference that it was important not to influence the International Court of Justice's decision about the legality of the one-sided declaration Kosovo's independence. However, he invited members of the NAM to abstain

²² <http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?mm=5&dd=26&yyyy=2009>

²³ cf. The politics of the non-alignment came out from the need of the countries to preserve the peace and peaceful coexistence between the countries, and therefore, "the politics of non-engagement was always principled and universal in its approach, engaged when it was about preserving peace and the protection of basic rights of peoples and the countries" (Tito 1981, 74).

²⁴ http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2009&mm=05&dd=26&nav_category=11&nav_id=362561;

cf. "We will be happy if we succeed with our objective analysis of current conditions in international affairs, and with our constructive suggestions, contribute to the improvement of the international situation" (Tito 1981, 22).

from accepting the new Kosovo state (Политика 2009g, 02; Вечерње новости 2009d, 12). Like Minister Jeremić, daily newspapers *Večernje novosti* write, that president Tadić at the Conference repeated that Serbia was the largest successor of the former Yugoslavia (Вечерње новости 2009e, 5). In addition, he reiterated at the Conference that even though Serbia's goal was to enter the EU, at the same time it continued to support goals of the Non-Aligned Movement. Notwithstanding, he also frequently repeated an outworn metaphor, that although global division from the time of the Cold War disappeared, "Belgrade remained the bond between the West and the East, and the North and the South" (Вечерње новости 2009e, 5). As a matter of fact, these political strategies were conducted in an attempt to give back to Serbia its old (Yugoslav) glow and global dandy appearance, with the purpose of keeping the Kosovo and Metohija provinces within Serbian territory.

This was to describe in more details specific parts of Serbian foreign policy and its relationship to the NAM and ex-Yugoslavia. As a result, the converging of foreign policy to the NAM is very prevalent in Serbia and slowly became an integral part of it. In other words, it represents political practice based on the SFRY Cold War experience, in order to keep Kosovo within Serbia and to provide a better economic and political position for the country.

VI "Yes, I've seen it before". Serbia and the NAM: final reflections

In order for communist Yugoslavia to keep its socialist but independent position from the USSR, it tactically played with the politics of "declarative independence from the East and the West". Depending on the situation, Yugoslavia's politics was leaned either towards the East or to the West. At the same time, Yugoslavia's affiliation to the NAM allowed it to feel as a part of a large movement, which substituted belonging to socialist states that isolated it (Kuljić 1998, 272). Using examples from the media, this reveals the specific Serbian foreign affairs discourse. In effect, this discourse represents the non-aligned ideas and affiliation to the NAM as an important Yugoslav heritage of which Serbia, as the largest country successor of the SFRY (and only because of that) has the legitimate right.

At the same time, Serbia strategically positions itself between the EU and the NAM with the goal of achieving official Serbian foreign policy's interests. In this respect, McCrone's (1998, 63) idea that "history is not the dead weight of the past on the present, but the very means whereby identity is shaped in an active and ongoing fashioning" is related. Serbia is using Yugoslavia's past in order to shape its own identity and politics. Consequently, the Republic of Serbia in the 21st century is symbolically connected with the federative unit of the SFRY- the Republic of Serbia from the Cold War. In fact, Serbia's 21st

century identity and its future are built through its historical and deceased federal unit of SFRY, Serbia. Jovanović asserts that in the 21st century "a clear reductionism on 'desirable' and 'non-desirable' contents of the past, works, processes, leaders and epochs" exists in Serbia (Јовановић 2009: 95). Example of that politics is renewed interests in the Non-Aligned Movement. In Serbia, non-alignment represents the idea of revival and reactivation of a Yugoslav heritage. In conclusion, Serbia's orientation for an "invisible presence" in the NAM is a conscious strategy for political and economic development of the country.

The destiny of a non-aligned Serbia in the future is related to what Serbia has to offer back to the non-aligned countries, beside the memory of Tito and the First Conference held in Belgrade. Referring to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,²⁵ Damian-Lakićević (2000, 45), explains that the FRY in the NAM could participate in the effort against the creation of a uni-polar world, and the dominancy of the USA. In this regard, the country founder²⁶ would participate again, and therefore the European dimension would be strengthened in the Movement (Damian-Lakićević 2000, 45-46). Consequently, the idea of a continued SFRY-FRY-RS is further essentialised.

As Yugoslavia's example shows, even though its intermediate position functioned well for several decades, at the end, it was only short-term project and consequently Yugoslavia was left out from all world teams. How Kosovo's secession will be resolved, ultimately will direct the Serbian version of non-alignment and possibly having "history repeating" itself. Will Serbian politicians be able to show to the world that it is the same country with the same people and (almost) with the same leader, while presenting this rhetoric to the Serbian public as the YU-nostalgic ideas? At the moment, this stays as an open question.

VII Epilogue

Recent events show that Serbian politicians will probably not manage to bridge the differences and the ambiguities between the socialist Yugoslavia and the democratic Serbia. On 22nd July 2010, The International Court of Justice in The Hague (ICJ) had ruled that Declaration on Kosovo Independence of 17th February 2008 did not break the Security Council Resolution 1244 or its constitutional framework²⁷ (Политика 2010).²⁸ On the

²⁵ By the same token (since the FRY only consisted from the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro), her ideas are applicable to the Republic of Serbia.

²⁶ Damian-Lakićević also identifies the SFR Yugoslavia with the FR Yugoslavia.

²⁷ B92 info writes that Serbia's legal team reminded that Kosovo independence was against the international law because it jeopardized the principle of Serbia's

SFR Yugoslavia...

other hand, Mr. Tadić, declared that Serbia would "never recognise the unilaterally-declared independence of Kosovo" and reiterated his government's call for new talks at the United Nations over Kosovo's status".²⁹ Furthermore, the president Tadić declared that Serbia will continue to defend its territorial integrity, and repeated that this decision will not "threaten the country's EU integration or peace policy".³⁰

In the last days of July 2010, Serbia submitted a Resolution to the UN General Assembly concerning the ICJ's opinion on Kosovo's status. It called for a mutually acceptable solution through dialog.³¹ Similarly, Foreign affairs minister, Mr. Jeremić, invited more than 120 states which did not support the independence of Kosovo, to support the Serbian resolution at the UN.³² At the same time, Serbia finally managed to establish closer relationships with the NAM. On 30th July 2010, the NAM's Coordinating Bureau in New York decided to hold two jubilee meetings for its 50th anniversary, one of them in Belgrade 2011.³³ In view of the fact that these are all evolving events, additional researches will be able to give further details to explain how the discrepancy between Serbian politicians' desires and Serbia's political possibilities are going to be resolved. For now, we can only wait to see what will be internationally accepted as legitimate Serbian position.

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territorial integrity without its acceptance, while the Security Council Resolution 1244 guarantees Serbia's territorial integrity. Therefore, according to the Serbian team, Kosovo's independence only interrupted negotiations on the Kosovo and Metohija legal status (http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2010&mm=07&dd=26&nav_id=447838).

²⁸<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-10729524>;

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-10734249>

²⁹ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-10733676>

³⁰ <http://www.tanjug.rs/DefaultE.aspx>

³¹ http://www.beta.co.rs/default.asp?lan=en&tip=article&kategorija=dailynews&id_a=2354183&id=&ime=

³² http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2010&mm=07&dd=30&nav_id=448800; <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-10812392>

³³ <http://www.tanjug.rs/DefaultE.aspx#>

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**SFR JUGOSLAVIJA TOKOM PERIODA HLADNOG RATA I
AKTUELNA SRPSKA SPOLJNA POLITIKA**

U radu se razmatra politika Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije tokom perioda Hladnog rata i neke od reperkusija za savremenu srpsku inostranu politiku. SFR Jugoslavija, iako komunistička zemlja, nije pripadala istočnom

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bloku (zemlje Varšavskog ugovora). Zahvaljujući svojoj političkoj orijentaciji i geografskoj poziciji, takođe nije pripadala ni zapadnom bloku (NATO). S tim u vezi, Jugoslavija, sa svojim predsednikom Josipom Brozom Titom, koristila je ovo na svoju korist da igra posredničku ulogu i da saraduje sa obe strane u različito vreme. Istovremeno, Jugoslavija je razvila i implementirala nesvrstanu međunarodnu politiku sa Indijom, Egiptom i Burmom. Samim tim, Jugoslavija se propagirala kao most između Istoka i Zapada. Analiza istorijskih podataka je pokazala da je ova nesvrstana pozicija bila posledica jugoslovenskog balansiranja između "dve vatre" i nalaženja najbolje opcije za zemlju. Trenutno, dok je glavni cilj Republike Srbije da pristupi EU, ona istovremeno pokušava da ostvari uticaj u nesvrstanim zemljama (Pokret nesvrstanih zemalja-PNZ) kao zemlja-posmatrač. Stoga, u radu se pravi paralela između nesvrstane pozicije SFRJ kao "strategije opstanka" tokom Hladnog rata i savremene spoljne politike Republike Srbije i njene strategije za postizanje sledećih ciljeva: pristupiti Evropskoj uniji i zadobiti podršku protiv nezavisnosti Kosova.

Ključne reči: Pokret nesvrstanih zemalja, SFR Jugoslavija, strategija opstanka, Republika Srbija, međunarodna politika, EU.