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## UNTHINKABLE: BODIES-IN-COMMON, QUEERNESS AND THE ETHICO-POLITICAL FICTION IN THE PRESENT

**Abstract:** The term *unthinkable* usually refers to what is beyond the common sense, rationality and generally accepted norms of thinking and doing. Unthinkable thus equals to non-normative, non-legal, or it is nonconstitutional. It means that thinking as such makes and reproduces the normativity – that thinking *is* normativity. Does it mean that we *can* think only about the things that we already know? How do we think change? How do we conceive the political? How do we think the unthinkable? The main idea of this presentation is to try to point to the ways in which the category such as "unthinkable" binds morality, ideology, thinking and politics in order to preserve the status quo of the existing social order. As a result, today, almost everything appears as thinkable – the tortures, the end of the life on earth, the militarization of the world, etc. The only "unthinkability" we can think of in contemporary world – is the possibility of the change and/or politics. We will try rethinking the figural status of queerness in hegemonic political spaces by the means of its constitutive experiences and relations with bodily, emotional and affective discourses and practices. The corporeal experiences and histories of queerness will be explored as the symptomatic disclosure and actualization of the very impossibility of, what Edelman has called, the politics of reproductive futurism. Thus, we will try arguing that the repoliticization of the intersections of queerness, corporeality, affects and politics is necessary for demystifying the groundless ground of society and the perpetual failure of politics to fully realize its promises of universal principle, a substance and a ground of the political order and society immune to revision and contestation.

**Key words:** unthinkable, (non)normativity, *queerness*, body experiences, social and political order

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### Unthinkable: The Thought of Beyond

The term *unthinkable* usually refers to the incapability of being conceived or considered, to something that escapes symbolization and representation, to something that is not comparable or that cannot be believed; it can also mean the incredible; inconceivable or unimaginable; extremely improbable in a way that goes against common sense. Unthinkable is what is beyond the common sense, rationality and generally accepted norms of thinking and doing. Unthinkable thus equals to non-normative, non-legal, or even to non-constitutional. Unthinkable is something that cannot find its own name and its own meaning.

In other words, it might also mean that thinking as such makes and reproduces the normativity – thinking *is* normativity. Does it mean that we *can* think only about the things that we already know? How do we think of change? How do we conceive the political? How do we think the unthinkable?

The main idea here is to try to point to the ways in which the category such as "unthinkable" binds morality, ideology, thinking and politics as a direct embodiment of general interests in order to preserve the *status quo* of the existing/dominant social order. As a result, today, almost everything appears as thinkable – the horrors and tortures, the end of the life on earth, market oriented everyday living, proprietary structures in capitalism, the militarization of the world, the militarization of the concept of humanity etc. The only "unthinkability" we can think of in contemporary world is the understanding of the notion of the political as necessarily related to continuous possibility of change.

The movie *Unthinkable* (2010), made by Gregor Jordan, opens up a set of questions on the status of what is un/thinkable in relation to dominant moral values of our time. Let us remind of the story: A convert to Islam, Yusuf, sends the U.S. government a tape showing him in three storage rooms, each of which may contain a nuclear bomb set to detonate in less than a week. Helen Brody, an FBI agent in L.A is tasked with finding the bombs while a CIA "consultant," known as H, interrogates the suspect who has allowed him to be caught. Yusuf, whose wife and children have left him and disappeared, seems to know exactly what the interrogation will entail. Even as H uses torture over Brody's objection, the suspect doesn't crack.

One of the most striking scenes in the movie relates to the moment when the official in charge of the operation demands that H brings Yusuf's children back in for further interrogation. H demands that Brody brings the children back in, because her decency will give him the moral approval that he needs to do the "unthinkable".

Agent Brody. Just do what you have to do!

H. What I have to do agent Brody is – unthinkable. Bring me the children.

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In this highly moralized, but also militant, violent and terrifying situation, what appears as 'unthinkable' is to harm the children and everyone agrees on that. Let us try to read this scene more carefully: what is actually "unthinkable" (one man torturing the other with the moral approval of a decent person) appears as rather thinkable and acceptable for a "greater" cause – finding the bombs and thus protecting and saving a thousands, maybe millions of lives, probably some of them being children (if it's not enough to simply say "lives"). Yet, does it mean that all lives do not worth the same? Should we sort them according to age, gender, nationality, ethnicity, etc.?

We would like to claim that it is a purely moralistic question that this scene is invoking, and as it is the case with all moralistic questions, the answer is already predefined, that is to say – there is no possibility of thinking which actually depoliticize the situation. Even more so, this situation defines the very limits of the logic of humanity. There is a social consensus that such an appeal to protect an innocent children is impossible to refuse. Of course, this social consensus is not related to any particular child as such but to the inscription of the figure of the innocent child<sup>3</sup> into the socio-symbolic structure; its function is purely representative.

Thus, the innocent child represents the helpless victim; a victim that needs to be in the scene in order to preserve the idea of moral and/or social order that needs to be protected. Nevertheless, what remains unquestionable are the moral and ideological presuppositions embedded in the scene, which are functioning through the complex web of state regulatory mechanisms are based on the idea that one has to die for the law that regulates our tradition, our very social substance. Perhaps this could explain the fact that what defines our understanding of the political is almost always related to violence, war and various kinds of exclusions and enmity. Thus, a war appears as a proper stage for this culture of sacrificing life, while simultaneously veiling these very mechanisms of sacrifice and violence, and thus entails and sustains the illusion of order's unquestioned phallic impenetrability, in the name of its perpetual reproduction and maintenance.

This sort of logic that relies on morally and ideologically unquestionable and unthinkable presuppositions, remains, at its core, conservative insofar as it works to affirm a structure, to authenticate social order, as well as the figure of child as the perpetual horizon of every acknowledged politics, the fantasmatic beneficiary of every future political intervention.

The figure of pure innocence (child) serves to prove its superiority over the corrupt and violent world. Contrary to what we usually think, we tend to think of the past as of a site that is ideologically contaminated. It appears ho-

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<sup>3</sup> See, Lee Edelman, *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2004).

wever, we would argue, that the most ideologically contaminated sites are the various discourses on the future that bear the logic of the present understanding of the political realm as a guarantee of status quo. This calls for the preservation and maintenance of the acknowledged politics and already existing socio-ideological order, an order that proves as the militarisation of thinking and politics. Such "self-evident" affirmation of values that are unquestioned and unquestionable impose an ideological limit on political discourse as such; it appears that its logic is in preserving the absolute privilege of the existing dominant social order and its normative aspects by rendering the unthinkable, by casting outside the political domain, the possibility of a resistance to this "unquestionable" organizing principles of social relation, some of them being a family, nation, religion, but also patriarchy, heteronormativity, etc.

Let us try, for a moment, to think the unthinkable. Let us be traitors, let us not be either just or right, and let us not have our proper place we are identified with. Let us try to create a space for ethico-political fiction in the present. Here is the fiction: Pride parade for heterosexuals. What is it in this idea that makes it seem as "unthinkable"? What is it that makes us feel such an event to appear as senseless in the world we live in? What makes heterosexuality to exist as the normative principle of social relations is precisely its unquestionable, unthinkable character. Try to imagine a group of heterosexuals wondering around the streets trying to mark a political space for their sexual preferences and choices; For their lifestyles; For their right to be different. What could be wrong with this scene? Can we imagine the very norm questioning, re-thinking and re-claiming its own normativity? True target of this, as we called it, ethico-political fiction in the present, would be nothing else but the power itself, the demand for the power to open up the space for its different functioning. This would imply the creation of political public spaces which would be self-referent, self-questioning by the very means of marking its unmarked political position, making visible its own mystified and closeted political histories, its own status of normativity, the mechanisms of power relations' normalization. It demands from us to make fiction necessity and to fictionalize, on the other side, order's unquestioned status of being reality, to invent new relationships, new possibilities of being-together, solidarity and sharing that is not based on protection and mirroring and self-reflective narcissistic claims of the identity, etc. It demands, we would argue, thinking and enacting modes and practices of communality which would be capable of engaging us in order to question the power regimes as such and open futurity towards differences not yet anticipated in the normalized frames of present political horizons.

It seems that it is precisely the "unthinkability", which serves the present power structures and the dominant social discourses as a law and as the last line of defense of the morality and humanity. What seems to be excluded from the participatory, multi-culturalist, tolerant democracy of our times is preci-

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sely the thinking of the unthinkable; the non-normative, non-legal, non-constitutional thinking which does not reproduce the already known, but rather a kind of thinking that opens up a space for a different functioning of power, for a change. Excluding the thinking of the unthinkable, excluding the possibility of the change as a necessary site of the political, makes us as impotent participants of the scene in which it is unthinkable to think of the improvement of life within our communities; or even more, to improve the act of life itself with all its complexities, extensions and trans-formations.

### **Bodies-in-Common**

Starting from this position, we will further try to think the possibilities for different political enactments derived from the figural status of queerness in hegemonic political spaces by the means of its constitutive experiences and relations with bodily, emotional and affective discourses and practices. The corporeal experiences and histories of queerness will be explored as the symptomatic disclosure and actualization of the very impossibility of, what Edelman has called, the politics of reproductive futurism. Thus, we will try arguing that the repoliticisation of the intersections of queerness, corporeality, affects and politics is necessary for demystifying the groundless ground of society and the perpetual failure of politics to fully realize its promises of universal principle, a substance and a ground of the political order and society immune to revision and contestation.

We find this stance to be radically necessary in the context of contemporary gay identity politics, past communist communal experiences in SEE, supranational unification of the European community and the revival of 'old' nationalisms as they all structurally overlap in sustaining a "totalitarian" and "immanentist" concept of community.

What we are facing in examples and different contexts is an ontic similarity expressed in the experience of community. Whether it is a moment of crisis of the community, or interruption in its continuity, imposed by political factors, or death, the community is being worked out by the very practices of recuperation of the lost immanence of the community. When there is social and bodily suffering, there is still the taking place, through communal mourning, of social death-making wherein atrocity is privatized, distanced, erased, forgotten and made foreign while community necessitates itself on its promised unity and survival. The eradication of death, suffering and pain becomes thus the core political technology of those in power in order to return the nation to its fantasmatic unity, bringing back believe in the redemptive notions of the law and universal citizenry and, consequently, the national utopia. Restoring thus the save and healthy unified body politic, the nation promises freedom, measured by the extent to

which one feels happiness and pleasure, as the achievement of legal cures against the allegedly localizable sources of pain and henceforth veils its constitutive and continuous acts of exclusion perpetuating suffering, structural violence and insidious and everyday forms of trauma.

What underlies these tendencies is, what Roberto Esposito would call, the **semantics of proprium**<sup>4</sup>. The semantics of proprium gathers around its paradigm notions related to belonging, appropriation, owning, possession, a set of rules and conventions, peculiarity, which is to say what belongs to human or species, but also what is an individual and single mark of specificity. It is what needs to be appropriated as common to all and each of us, to communicate what is proper to us, to possess and own our property, what appropriates our singularities as its own and our belonging to the uttermost appropriate essence.

This constellation imposes the exigency of rethinking the constitutive relation between body's finitude as its singular and contingent spacing, relations and exposure, as the very political abyss and, thus, consequently opening community towards the necessary futurity of democracy-to-come, on the other.

In the preface of the *Inoperative Community* Jean Luc Nancy elaborates the difference he makes between, what he calls, *the political*, on the one side and *politics*, on the other side. Nancy determines the political as the very act of institution of politics, the origin and foundation of politics, or the "site where what it means to be in common is open to definition". Politics, on the other hand, would signify the play, the struggle of forces and interests "engaged in a conflict over the representation and governance of social existence"<sup>5</sup>. Thus, the political would attempt to mark the instituting moment of society which compensates for the groundless ground of society, or the supplement for the groundless stature of society, which, as such, withdraws at the very moment it grounds society. The political helps Nancy to describe the abyssal character of the social, which is to say the contingent foundations of its institutions, organization, distribution and principle.

Unlike the above-mentioned cultural, social and political tendencies, for Nancy community does never sublate the finitude of the singularities. On the contrary, it is nothing other than exactly this exposure of finitude as such. A community is always a community of finite beings and as such, a finite community. The community is the site of the existence of being-in-common as the radically opposite of the common being or the being of togetherness that always presupposes the transcendence of an immanence outside the existence itself as the essence and meaning of community. The essence of this being-in-common

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<sup>4</sup> Esposito Roberto. *Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of Community* (Stanford: Stanford University Press: 2010)

<sup>5</sup> Nancy Jean-Luc. *The Inoperative Community* (Minneapolis and Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), xxxvii

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lies concretely in the "in" which is the very relatedness and communication of singularities. This "in" precedes every subjectivity, individuality or identity because it exposes the singular being towards its outside, which is always the other being exposed itself. What is proper to one's existence, according to this logic, is exactly the 'expropriation' that deprives the individual of its uttermost individuality and property. Community is our being-in-common that prevents and disables every single attempt of absolute and complete immanence.

Jean-Luc Nancy's thinking on ontology and the tracing of the essence of the political is, we claim, first and foremost, ontology of bodies. The body is only body as much as it is outside itself, permanently, since the very begging exposed towards its outside. The body in Jean-Luc's corpus is the locus of singularity and the site where being-in-common discloses itself. If singularity was the transformational accumulation of traces of touching, this singularity is nothing more but a body exposed to the differentiation of states, moods, movements and transformations. The body is involving and that's how it is in its most proper mode, always already as extended, or even better distended, stretched towards its outside, in the in-between of the 'with'<sup>6</sup>. Its 'it' is the plural interference of touches, back and forward, and as such does not preexist them. Matter, the body's matter is what is shared in the sharing of being. Sharing of matter does not happen between two subjects directing the movement of their bodies, neither between two intentional and transcendental consciousness subordinating bodily involution to its prerogatives. There is no matter as substance, nor subject as intentionally oriented prior to the very act of sharing of matter, of matter as sharing. "Body is certainty shattered and blown to bits. Nothing's more proper, nothing's more foreign to our old world."<sup>7</sup>

A similar direction of thought is undertaken also in the vast field of discourses in the last two decades theorizing the body and what Patricia Clough has described as "the affective turn"<sup>8</sup>, particularly interested in the involvement of the body, affects and emotions in everyday practices of resistance and recording, but also the processes and movements of undoing and shattering the significations' grids organizing and structuring cultures and political worlds. Special importance for our argumentation have the investigations in bodily movements, intervals, passages and transitions, or, what Brian Massumi has called the 'ontological difference into the heart of the body'<sup>9</sup> and its non-coin-

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<sup>6</sup> Jean-Luc Nancy, *Corpus*, trans. Richard Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008)

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 4

<sup>8</sup> Patricia Clough ed. *The Affective Turn: Theorising the Social* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007)

<sup>9</sup> Brian Massumi, *Parables of the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002),3

cidence with itself, as well as affects' and emotions' constitutive relationality and bodies' radical potential for modification and vulnerability. The body becomes immediately connected to its process of formation always taking place in a global field of relations where its emergence is open onto dynamic and nonlinear potential for entering relations and shifts.

### **Queer Relationality**

If one should write a history of queer life, it will be writing the history of tears. A queer history is the history of loss. The history of shame, exclusion, discrimination, homophobia, grief, suffering, pain, depression, melancholia, fear, regret, loneliness and death is a history of loss. It is written in the name (queer). What is designated when referring to a history of loss is the bodily exposure and the deprivation of one's utmost being which is nothing more than relation. The history of loss is the history of relations suppressed and erased from history. What is signified as loss is also the loss of equal access to relations to one's body, of a body with the world it shares and is-in, of a body with the entire spectrum of cultural significations, commodities and products of human labour. The loss is the loss of the possibility of entering relations and participation in the shared and common world. It is the loss of public spaces as the arena of co-habitation where people come and lose themselves in the encounter with the other while becoming otherwise.

The queer archive is the archive of negative and backward feelings<sup>10</sup> inflicted by the deprivation of the potentials for bodily extension. When writing of loss one would necessarily be writing on the social structures inflicting a loss and thus the history of backwardness would be the history of progress. The losses in this way would not be an enumeration of personal grieves, emotions and affects, although they are that as well, I'm sure of it. But what these losses expose is the exploitation and the violence of the bodily exposure we all are. They expose how one's bodily openness has been impinged on by the environment it dwells in. There would thus be no gay identity without this primary abjection and negative action of power. Identity is the retrospective recuperation of the bodily and psychic damages and opportunities reflecting the price of social inclusion or exclusion. Identity is the sign of a failed or realized relation being sterilized in the frames of recognisability. Identity would thus not be the expression of one's true self and essence, but rather the image of relational traces, a genealogy of the contacts, encounters and touches with other bodies. Identity is the indicator of one's orientation towards the world accumulated in a history of relations blocked or sustained, a fetishised spectacle of forgotten touches and

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<sup>10</sup> Heather Love. *Feeling Backwards* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007)

exchanges. Identity is the pattern of inscribed emotional scripts, forms of affective cognition situated in a body, constraining the field of possible relations one can establish with the world one shares with others. Spoiled identity is the mark of spoiled and ruined sociality, of one's deprivation of the ability to be-*in*-common and one's reduction to being-common.

Emphasizing this recourse would turn away the focus of thinking the political institution as the constitutive exclusion of certain identities and lives as its outside, and would set it towards thinking the exclusion, regulation and eradication of certain 'forms of life' that is to say certain relational modes of being. One's loss is the loss of many, the irreversible loss of the potential of a multiplicity and community.

And yet, there is another meaning oscillating in the queer existence, written in its name, and set on the margins of its history. Queer signifies the reverse of the conditions of suffering and shame, the proud reevaluations of the negative prerogatives ascribed with discourses and practices of homophobia and violence, and the political reappropriation of these hegemonic discursive fields for the purposes of struggle, resistance and radical resignification and re-institution of normative horizons. The potential for practicing, imagining and fantasizing new relations and possibilities of life departing from marginal spaces as the historical contingencies of the forces of power and exclusion in Foucault's late work are most paradigmatically exemplified as bodily practices, as resistance away from desire to the surfaces and self-transformational capacities of bodies and pleasure.<sup>11</sup> The new queer taxonomies related to queer sexual practices are maps of the *corposcapes/bodyscapes* that have been discovered or invented and produced in the socially marginal spaces, into world-making projects where relations established have significantly displaced the foundational premises of community. Spaces of marginalization have become sites of sociability organized around the sharing of social abjection.<sup>12</sup>

Eve Sedgwick Kosofski in *Touching Feeling*, analyzes queer and queer performativity as socially tied to those whose identity sense-making has been centered and tuned around the experience of shame and, consequently, to the practices of performativity as strategies "for the production of meaning and being, in relation to the affect shame and to the later and related fact of stigma."<sup>13</sup> Following Silvan Tomkins and Michael Franz Basch, Kosofski traces the affect of shame as originary involved in the constitution of one's sense of distinction and

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<sup>11</sup> Michel Foucault, 'The End of the Monarchy of Sex' in Foucault Live. Collected Interviews, 1961-1984. Ed. By Sylvere Lotringer (Semiotexte, New York: 1996), 311

<sup>12</sup> Michael Warner, *The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics and the Ethics of Queer Life* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 34

<sup>13</sup> Eve Sedgwick Kosofski, *Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003)

identity. Shame, unlike guilt, is focused on what one is rather than on what one does. It concerns the being of the one blushing and averting his/her eyes and the meaning ascribed which in a dialectical turn becomes the basis for one's self-consciousness and identification. Shame in Kosofski's account is ambiguously tied to a primary narcissism which as much as differentiates one simultaneously throws one into the gravitational field of the other and thus undoes the self-sufficient narcissistic formations of the ego. Kosofski in several occasions in the line of her argumentation throughout the book emphasizes that this self-positioning in the relation of shame is not to be conceived as an attachment to a securely provided essences, but rather as "the place where the question of identity arises most originally and most relationally," and further on bolds the transformational capacities that can be derived from the double structure of performativity – self-absorption and theatricality- and consequently made available for the "work of metamorphosis, reframing, refiguration, transformation, affective and symbolic loading and deformation(...)all to potent for the work of purgation and deontological closure."<sup>14</sup> Analyzing the work of Henry James, Kosofski traces these potentials for identity-play generated by the double movement of absorption and identity enclosure and theatricality as the opening towards the outside, the audience, which introduces a gap in the felicity of the performative act and produces possibilities for disidentification and transformation. Yet, we would claim, Kosofski, although mentions the relational basis undoing the circuit of identification, remains caught in the identity logic even when mapping the transformational capacities and de-essentializing tendencies. What remains eluded in the end is the relation preceding and the interruption of this relation. It is not to claim that Kosofski overlooks this question in her book. She quotes Tomkins and Basch exactly on those points where they emphasize the relational violence and inequality shame introduces, yet she shifts her focus on identity problems which, although dispersed on the resignificatory axis as potential still remain caught in the dominant logic of meaning, sense and signification overshadowing the question of relationality.

What we are claiming is that identity becomes the mystification of a more urgent political question, and this is the question of the social relation. Thus, if there is a point one should start with when enacting a performance of resistance, as we've argued, is from this, our utmost receptivity and exposure in the relationality with the other in order to create the conditions for body's singular plural curving, excesses and transformations that would contest the self-reproducing limits of the normative horizon of recognisability and accessibility/acceptability of certain kind of relations instead of others. A queer performativity would thus be not the revenge of the identity formed as the signified remnant of shame transforming itself with obligatory reference to its predecessor (the spoiled

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 63

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identity), but rather the revenge of the virtual that was violated and disabled, the relational hurricane as the most appropriate dis-appropriating condition of our embodied and finite humanity. Aligning with Butler, we claim that reimagining community can start exactly from this place where we are all undone one by each other and where we share loss and vulnerability as what deprives us of the possibility of complete comprehension rendering us unable to finalize mourning and to restore, neither ourselves nor the relation lost that sustains us in fundamental way beyond any foundational politics on the horizon. Hence, imagining community "affirms relationality not only as a descriptive or historical fact of our formation, but also as an ongoing normative dimension of our social and political lives, one in which we are compelled to take stock of our interdependence(...) that primary way in which we are, as bodies, outside ourselves and for one another."<sup>15</sup> If there is a possibility for us to say 'we' this possibility can only be found in the minimal signifiatory universalisation of our common experience of exposure and being-in-relation, the double edged experience of vulnerability and transformativity intersecting through the body, following from our bodily life as what puts us all outside, beside ourselves.

We argue that queer resistance should be engaged from the lived experiences. Attending to this stance, queerness mostly associated with homosexuality would have to strive towards its hetero-sexualisation so that it can produce unpredictable forms of sexualisation and sociality excluded from the relational sterilized matrices of heterosexuality which continually reproduces itself as homo-sexuality. Engaging *from* the lived experiences does not imply in any way holding to one's lived experience as an indicator of true feelings, but rather drawing a line of flight *from, off* this experience and imagining otherwise, opening spaces for relations and world-making projects each time singular. The lived experience of queers is the experience of lived and skin-felt exclusion, suffering, loss, hatred and self-hatred, shame, phobia, abjection, but also the experience taking unpredictable routes of pleasure and joy departing from exactly the same marginal spaces of suffering. The lived experience of queers is the experience of felt relationality, when it has been devastated, in instances of *failure*, as well as it has shocked one's habituated bodily capacities and patterns of response and cognition, as instances of *becomings*.

This recourse aims towards holding to the experience of marginal situations, as those instants when one feels disoriented and feels in its strongest the blow of the precariousness of social systems, the instants when communal promises of fulfillment of self-transparency fail and what they reveal is our sheer exposure in the world we all are left to alone with and in one-with-another. The lived experience is the one of exposure to intensities that has tracked us all off the con-

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<sup>15</sup> Judith Butler, *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence* (London, New York: Verso, 2004), 27

formity of habituated bodily hexis and off the lightness of uninterrupted extensions in already felt spaces. These situations, these extraordinary situations, singularizing situations, that we move from being a person as a generic member of society to being a becoming, a haecceity or consistency<sup>16</sup>, a person undergoing depersonalization by opening to the intensive processes, these processes shatter the solid ground of habituated actuality and the normative operating procedures of day-to-day life movements and knock a force.

As Hannah Arendt has written extensively on, thinking is necessarily related to ethics and politics; not thinking leads to genocide. For Arendt, thinking relates precisely to its non-normative, non-institutional aspect; thinking means plurality against every homogenous, institutionalized and dominant logic. According to her, thinking is always already critical since it can't be reduced to any particular law itself; even if it is the law of preserving and maintaining the existing social order. Thinking is thus always already plural and it maintains plurality of the self as well as the plurality of the community. Thinking that is related to ethics and politics should stake its claim to the realm which makes "ethics and politics" unthinkable; the realm beyond the field within which ethics and politics as we know them appear; and so beyond the overall monolithic demands for preserving the religious and moral foundations of thinking as such.

Deconstruction as a way of thinking (about the unthinkable) begins with identification of what goes without questioning. Therefore, its true task is not in resolving the already identified problems, moral or any other dilemmas, but in reflecting and reformulating them as well as rethinking the ways in which we perceive the existing problems of our time. The process of deconstruction marks the "other" side of thinking: the side that is beyond the all "thinkable" sides. Thus, the ethics and politics – being the question of the relationship with the other – are always already about the unthinkable, and it is this unthinkability that inextricably binds them to thinking.

Hence, we think it is necessary to introduce the excessive moment of corporeality as the not-yet-realized tendency towards a futurity that can be transformationally monstrous and unthinkable. If what needs to be sustained as the core condition for our urgent rethinking of community is relationality itself as the ongoing dimension of our existence, vulnerability and loss would not be sufficient grounds for extending our normative horizons. A normative horizon would have to extend its limits of recognisability, and this extension can only be done by reconsidering the ruptures of a political order and public spaces indexed by the inverted, perverse and anomalous bodies, for which queer eroticism figures as the political unconscious. These ruptures of the political ground represent not only the already existing symptomatic spots in community's failure for its im-

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<sup>16</sup> John Protevi, *Political Affect: Connecting the Social and the Somatic* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 138

manent self-re-production, but also the not-yet-present, unthinkable future to come as the capacity of the singular plural unfolding of bodies-in-common.

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**NEMISLIVO: TELA ZAJEDNO, *QUEERNESS* I ETIČKOPOLITIČKA  
FIKCIJA U SADAŠNJOSTI**

Termin nemislivo se uglavnom odnosi na ono što je izvan zdravog razuma, racionalnosti i opšte prihvaćenih normi mišljenja i delovanja. Nemislivo se tako izjednačava sa ne-normativnim, ne-pravnim, ili ne-konstitutivnim. To znači da mišljenje kao takvo tvori i reprodukuje normativnost – da mišljenje *jeste* normativnost. Da li to znači da možemo misliti samo o stvari koje već znamo? Kako mislimo promenu? Kako poimamo političko? Kako mislimo nemislivo? Osnovna ideja ovoga rada jeste da ukaže na načine na koje kategorije poput "nemislivog" povezuju moralnost, ideologiju, mišljenje i politiku kako bi održale *status quo* postojećeg društvenog poretka. Otuda se danas gotovo sve čini zamislivim – mučenje, kraj života na Zemlji, militarizacija sveta, itd. Jedina "nemislivost" o kojoj možemo razmišljati u savremenom svetu – jeste mogućnost promene i/ili politike. Pokušaćemo da ponovo promislimo figurativni status *queerness*-a u hegemonijskim političkim prostorima preko njegovih konstitutivnih iskustava i veza s telesnim, emocionalnih i afektivnim diskursima i praksama. Telesna iskustva i istorije *queerness*-a biće istražene kao simptomatično otkrivanje i ostvarivanje same nemogućnosti onoga što Edelman naziva politikama reproduktivnog futurizma. Na taj način, biće učinjen pokušaj da se ustvrdi da je neophodna ponovna politizacija ukrštanja *queerness*-a, telesnosti, osećanja i politike kako bi se demistifikovao neosnovani temelj društva i konstantni neuspeh politike da u potpunosti ostvari svoja obećanja o univerzalnom principu, suštini i osnovi političkog poretka i društva koje je imuno na preispitivanje i osporavanje.

**Ključne reči:** nemislivo, (ne)normativnost, *queerness*, telesna iskustva, socijalni i politički poredak